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THE TRANSITION TO SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS




In 2013, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
adopted Annex 19 to the Chicago Convention to implement
Safety Management Systems (SMS) for airlines around the
world. While most ICAO Member States worldwide are still in
the early stages of introducing SMS, Canada became the first
and only ICAO country in 2008 to fully implement SMS for all
Canadian-registered airlines.
This article will highlight the documented shortcomings of
SMS in Canada during the implementation of the first ever SMS
framework in civil aviation. While air carriers struggled to un-
derstand and introduce SMS into their operations, this article
will illustrate how Transport Canada (TC) did not have the
knowledge or the necessary resources to properly guide airline
operators during this transition, how SMS was improperly tai-
lored for smaller air carriers, and how the Canadian govern-
ment canceled safety inspections around the country, leaving
many air carriers partially unregulated.
This article will argue that TC has effectively deregulated
flight safety in certain areas of its aviation industry under SMS.
Drawing on recent safety statistics and accident investigation re-
ports, this article will illustrate how TC’s inadequate safety over-
sight during the adoption of SMS resulted in several accidents,
putting the traveling public at risk. To support these findings,
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five Canadian air carriers were interviewed to provide their ex-
clusive perspective into the chaotic implementation of SMS in
Canada and how the safety levels for Canadian carriers have
been compromised. This article will conclude by presenting po-
litical, economic, and legal solutions to rectify the deregulation
of flight safety in Canada.
I. INTRODUCTION
SINCE THE INCEPTION of air transportation at the dawn ofthe twentieth century, aviation safety has been a dynamic va-
riable both positively and negatively affected by human activi-
ties.1 If safety is not proactively regulated by the state, it is
axiomatic that the “invisible-hand” of safety will tolerate negative
externalities caused by the driving business imperatives of the
commercial aviation industry. Organizational decisions by air-
lines are shaped by economic, political, and operational impedi-
ments, all of which may directly or indirectly impact the overall
safety of flight operations.2 Safety, therefore, behaves as a cycli-
cal, socio-politico-economic variable, as demonstrated through-
out the history of government safety regulation. Therefore, it is
not surprising to observe that airline deregulation, which first
landed in Canada under the National Transportation Act of
1987,3 had adverse consequences on aviation safety.
Destructive competition, unleashed by the sudden liberaliza-
tion of the market, forced many air carriers into financial dis-
tress and self-destructive practices to remain profitable.4 In fact,
many carriers suffering from anemic profitability had no choice
but to curtail safety costs, such as aircraft maintenance, fleet and
equipment upgrades, aircrew training, salaries, etc.5 While eco-
1 KATHLEEN M. SUTCLIFFE & KARL E. WEICK, MANAGING THE UNEXPECTED 40
(2001); Georgios Leloudas, Legal Aspects of Aviation Risk Management (Aug.
2003) (unpublished LL.M. thesis, McGill University) (on file with the McGill Li-
brary, McGill University).
2 James Reason, Understanding Adverse Events: Human Factors, 4 INT’L J. QUALITY
IN HEALTH CARE 80 (1995).
3 JOHN CHRISTOPHER & JOSEPH P. DION, TRANSP. CAN., THE CANADIAN AIRLINE
INDUSTRY (2002), http://publications.gc.ca/Collection-R/LoPBdP/CIR/892-
e.htm [http://perma.cc/UBL6-SCJH]. The National Transportation Act of 1987
has since been repealed and replaced by the Canada Transportation Act, S.C.
1996, c 10.
4 PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY & LAURENCE E. GESELL, AIRLINE MANAGEMENT STRATE-
GIES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 193–97 (3d ed. 2012) [hereinafter AIRLINE MANAGE-
MENT STRATEGIES].
5 PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY & ANDREW R. GOETZ, AIRLINE DEREGULATION AND
LAISSEZ-FAIRE MYTHOLOGY 298 (1992).
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nomic deregulation did not intend to deregulate aviation safety
per se,6 the industry’s debilitated financial health7 inevitably con-
tributed to a series of deadly accidents in the 1980s and early-
1990s. Since aviation safety cannot be divorced from the finan-
cial health of a carrier,8 many airlines struggled to adequately
balance profitability and their passengers’ safety.9 As such, the
“economic strains created by the intensive pricing competition
unleashed by deregulation . . . had a deleterious effect on car-
rier safety.”10
In response to the deadly crash of Air Ontario Flight 1363 in
Dryden (Ontario, Canada),11 the Canadian government
launched the Commission of Inquiry into the crash, lead by Jus-
tice Virgil P. Moshansky (also referred to as “The Moshansky
Commission”).12 The objective of this public inquiry was to de-
termine how organizational factors may have contributed to the
accident and, more importantly, to determine how the indus-
try’s unhealthy economics and poor safety culture were becom-
ing a serious threat to the traveling public. Justice Moshansky
submitted 191 aviation safety recommendations for the entire
6 AIRLINE MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at 300.
7 DEMPSEY & GOETZ, supra note 5, at 225 (“[D]eregulation has brought about
cutthroat pricing, a miserable level of industry profitability, insufficient capital to
reequip aging fleets, and a deterioration of service. Since deregulation began, the
airline industry has suffered the worst economic losses in its history.”).
8 Id. at 304.
9 Paul Stephen Dempsey, The Rise and Fall of the Civil Aeronautics Board—Open-
ing Wide the Floodgates of Entry, 11 TRANSP. LAW J. 91, 167 (1980).
10 DEMPSEY & GOETZ, supra note 5, at 305.
11 Rene´ David-Cooper, Landing Safety Management Systems (SMS) in Aviation: The
Implementation of Annex 19 for Commercial Air Carriers in Canada, 40 ANNALS AIR &
SPACE L. 445, 451 (2015). The accident happened on “March 10th, 1989, when
Air Ontario Flight 1363 crashed shortly after takeoff in Dryden, Ontario, killing
twenty-four people onboard. The pilots had taken off without proper de-icing of
the aircraft’s wings. Wing contamination significantly reduced aerodynamic lift
and did not allow the Fokker F-28-1000 Fellowship to remain airborne after de-
parture. Earlier that day, Flight 1363 had landed in Dryden during a snowstorm
to refuel with a full load of passengers. The pilots could not shut down their
engines because the company, as a cost-saving measure, had not fixed the air-
craft’s Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) to restart its turbine engines and did not pro-
vide any ground start facilities at the Dryden Regional Airport (CYHD). With a
company policy forbidding de-icing while the aircraft’s engines were running, the
Captain ignored the risks as he attempted takeoff . . . to avoid stranding the
entire flight crew and passengers at the company’s great expense. As a result,
organizational decisions by Air Ontario condemned Flight 1363 to a tragic fate.”
Id.
12 HON. JUSTICE VIRGIL P. MOSHANKSY, COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE AIR
ONTARIO CRASH AT DRYDEN ONTARIO-FINAL REPORT (1992) (Can.).
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aviation industry after a twenty-four-month investigation and
concluded for the first time in the history of aviation accident
investigations that organizational factors contributed to the acci-
dent. This report paved the way for the adoption of Safety Man-
agement Systems (SMS) for airlines in Canada and around the
world, as there was an evident need to manage the impact of
organizational decisions on safety levels in the commercial air
transportation industry.
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) defines
SMS as a “systematic approach to managing safety, including the
necessary organizational structures, accountabilities, policies[,]
and procedures.”13 When Canada announced in 2005 that SMS
would become a regulatory requirement for all Canadian-regis-
tered air service providers,14 it became the first and only ICAO
Member State to announce implementation of SMS.15 Since
ICAO did not adopt Annex 19 to the Chicago Convention16 un-
til 2013 to address Standards and Recommended Practices
(SARPs)17 for SMS, Canada led the international aviation com-
13 Int’l Civil Aviation Org. [ICAO], Safety Management Manual (SMM), at 1–2,
ICAO Doc. 9859 (3d ed. 2013).
14 TRANSPORT CANADA’S ENFORCEMENT OF AIR SAFETY REGULATIONS AND IMPLE-
MENTATION OF SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS (2009) (Can.) [hereinafter TC’S EN-
FORCEMENT OF AIR SAFETY REGULATIONS]; OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GEN. OF CAN.,
REPORT OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL OF CANADA TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS: OVER-
SIGHT OF CIVIL AVIATION—TRANSPORT CANADA 8 (2012) [hereinafter OVERSIGHT
OF CIVIL AVIATION REPORT]; TRANSP. CAN., SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS FOR
SMALL AVIATION OPERATIONS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO IMPLEMENTATION 1 (2004)
[hereinafter SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS GUIDE]; Canadian Aviation Regula-
tions, SOR/1996-433 § 107.01. Under SMS, the term “service provider” refers to
air carriers, flight training units, air traffic control services, airports, and aircraft
maintenance organizations conducting maintenance for air operators subject to
SMS regulations.
15 An Act to Amend the Aeronautics Act and to Make Consequential Amendments to
Other Acts: Hearing on Bill C-6 Before the Standing Comm. on Transp., Infrastructure &
Cmtys., 39th Parl., 40th Meeting (2007) (Can.) [hereinafter Hearing on Bill C-6,
40th Meeting]; Rene´ David-Cooper, Implementing Safety Management Systems (SMS)
in Canada: Is Flight Safety on a Collision Course with the Forced Disclosure of SMS Data?,
15 ISSUES AVIAT. L. & POL’Y 77, 78 (2015).
16 ICAO, Convention on International Civil Aviation, Annex 19 Safety Manage-
ment Standards and Recommended Practices (Nov. 14, 2013) [hereinafter An-
nex 19].
17 ICAO, Assembly Res. 36-13, Consolidated Statement of Continuing ICAO Policies
and Associated Practices Related Specifically to Air Navigation, ICAO Doc. 9902 (2007)
[hereinafter Assembly Res. 36-13]. Under Annex 19, Standards are compulsory
and Recommended Practices are merely a desired level of performance estab-
lished as a common State endeavor. SARPs can be considered as “soft law” since
they are not, per se, part of the Chicago Convention.
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munity in the deployment of the first ever SMS in civil avia-
tion.18 Without the benefit of other countries’ experiences, it
was expected that some difficulties would be encountered dur-
ing this innovative transition.19 This article will scrutinize the im-
plementation of SMS throughout Canadian commercial
aviation. Although the theoretical benefits of SMS are not con-
tested, there is strong evidence that Canada has struggled and
continues to struggle with the implementation of SMS in avia-
tion. Secondly, Transport Canada (TC) has seemingly failed to
fully uphold its oversight responsibilities under this new safety
regime. As such, it will be argued that Canada’s implementation
of SMS has effectively deregulated flight safety in certain areas of
its aviation industry. While this article will exclusively focus on
Canada, it will offer invaluable insight to other ICAO Member
States who wish to avoid similar transitional problems during
the upcoming rollout of SMS worldwide. For the purpose of this
article, five informants employed by different Canadian opera-
tors who participated in the transition to SMS were interviewed
in 2014 to obtain a practical assessment of this new safety
regime:
• Informant #1 manages a certified airport and a flight train-
ing unit (FTU). Informant #1 is also a TC flight examiner.
• Informant #2 previously worked as a safety officer for an
airline operating in northern Canada.
• Informant #3 is a TC flight examiner. Informant #3 also
manages a certified airport and is a part-time captain for a
charter flight company operating in Canada and in the
United States.
• Informant #4 is a safety officer for an airline operating in
northern Canada.
• Informant #5 works for a Canadian airline operating
internationally.
To preserve anonymity and confidentiality, these operators will
be referred to as “informants” throughout this article.
18 TRANSP. CAN., REPORT Z 5000-7-1 U, AVIATION SAFETY PROGRAM MANUAL FOR
THE CIVIL AVIATION DIRECTORATE 6 (2012), http://www.coscap-na.com/sites/de
fault/files/aviation-safetymanual-issue2_0.pdf [http://perma.cc/7A4B-SCPG].
19 OVERSIGHT OF CIVIL AVIATION REPORT, supra note 14, at 28.
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II. BACKGROUND—THE CHAOTIC IMPLEMENTATION
OF SMS IN CANADA
A. THE REGULATORY SCOPE OF SMS: IS THE TRAVELING
PUBLIC AT RISK?
Before examining how Canadian operators implemented
SMS, it is necessary to explain the structure of the Canadian avi-
ation industry. Currently, Canadian commercial air carriers
transporting passengers are divided into three main categories:
• Air Taxi Operators (703 carriers) are small carriers that can
carry up to nine passengers inclusively in an aircraft with a
MTOW20 of 19,000 pounds or less.21
• Commuter Operators (704 carriers) are carriers that can carry
between ten and nineteen passengers inclusively22 in a
multi-engine aircraft with a MTOW of 19,000 pounds or
less, or a turbo-jet-powered airplane that has a maximum
zero fuel weight of 50,000 pounds.23
• Airline Operators (705 carriers) are carriers authorized to op-
erate aircraft with a MTOW of more than 19,000 pounds or
that can carry twenty or more passengers.24 These include
large airlines, such as Air Canada, First Air, Porter Airlines,
WestJet, Sunwing Airlines, Air Transat, etc.
In Canada, SMS was progressively introduced and implemen-
tation deadlines varied depending on the carrier’s type of opera-
tion. The then existing 705 carriers were required to have SMS
by 2008,25 and new airlines applying for a 705 operator’s certifi-
20 MTOW is the maximum takeoff weight of an aircraft when fully loaded with
fuel, cargo, and passengers.
21 Canadian Aviation Regulations, SOR/1996-433 § 107.01.
22 Id.
23 Id. § 704.01.
24 Id. § 705.01.
25 Hearing on Bill C-6, 40th Meeting, supra note 15, at 1540 (statement of Daniel
Maurino, Coordinator, Flight Safety and Human Factors, ICAO: “Transport Ca-
nada is leading the world aviation community in the deployment of SMS in civil
aviation.”); Study: Transport Canada’s Enforcement of Air Safety Regulations and Imple-
mentation of Safety Management Systems for the Aviation Industry, Before the Standing
Comm. on Transp., Infrastructure & Cmtys., 40th Parl., 39th Meeting (2009); OVER-
SIGHT OF CIVIL AVIATION REPORT, supra note 14, ch. 5 at 7 (“Canada was the first
country in the world to regulate the implementation of SMS in the aviation in-
dustry. Since 2008, Transport Canada has required air operators whose aircraft
carry [twenty] passengers or more and their maintenance organizations (referred
to as large civil aviation companies) to use SMS in managing their safety risks.”);
OFFICE OF AUDITOR GEN. OF CAN., REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS: OVER-
SIGHT OF AIR TRANSPORTATION SAFETY, ch. 3 at 10 (2008).
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cate were obliged to have SMS starting in 2005.26 As such, SMS
was fully operational for every large airline as of 2008. Large
airports,27 Approved Maintenance Organizations (AMOs) con-
ducting maintenance for carriers subject to SMS regulations,28
and Canada’s air traffic provider,29 NavCanada, were also re-
quired to have SMS by 2008.30 The smaller 703 and 704 opera-
tors (referred to in the industry as “small carriers,” “bush flying
operators,” or “small operators”)31 were initially scheduled to in-
itiate the implementation of SMS in 2008, but it was postponed
indefinitely due to the significant implementation problems en-
countered with 705 carriers at the time of this writing.32 Despite
this, a minority of 703 and 704 carriers have started adopting
SMS on a voluntary basis.
Including five large carriers that account for 60% of revenue-
generating passenger miles traveled,33 thirty-nine 705 carriers
operate in Canada34 and carry 95% of the entire market of trav-
eling passengers.35 The remainder of the industry is composed
of 538 air taxi operators and eighty-nine commuter carriers.36
Considering that Canadian air carriers transport close to 79 mil-
lion domestic passengers every year,37 the current scope of SMS
26 SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS GUIDE, supra note 14, at 2. Starting in 2005,
new 705 carriers applying for an operator’s certificate were obliged to implement
SMS as a necessary condition to obtain their certificate. This applied to Porter
Airlines, which began operating in 2006, for example, whereas existing airlines
were granted an exemption until 2008.
27 Canadian Aviation Regulations, SOR/1996-433 §§ 107.01, 302.01, 302.500.
28 Id. §§ 573.01, 573.32.
29 Id. §§ 804.01, 805.05.
30 TC’S ENFORCEMENT OF AIR SAFETY REGULATIONS, supra note 14.
31 SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS GUIDE, supra note 14, at 1.
32 Allison Padova, Les syste`mes de gestion de la se´curite´: une meilleure approche pour
les transports?, REPORT 2013-77-F BIBLIOTHE`QUE DU PARLEMENT. SERVICE
D’INFORMATION ET DE RECHERCHE PARLEMENTAIRES, http://www.parl.gc.ca/con
tent/lop/ResearchPublications/2013-77-f.pdf [http://perma.cc/99U7-VT7Z];
Transp. Safety Bd. of Can., Air Safety Management Systems, GOV’T OF CAN. (2013),
http://www.bst-tsb.gc.ca/eng/medias-media/videos/surveillance-watchlist/avia
tion/aviation-video-04.asp [http://perma.cc/6LA7-BULT].
33 OVERSIGHT OF CIVIL AVIATION REPORT, supra note 14, at 15.
34 TRANSP. CAN., TRANSPORTATION IN CANADA—COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW 47
(2011), https://www.tc.gc.ca/media/documents/policy/Transportation_in_Ca
nada_2011.pdf [http://perma.cc/V2QF-96ST].
35 TC’S ENFORCEMENT OF AIR SAFETY REGULATIONS, supra note 14.
36 SATEFY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS GUIDE, supra note 14, at 47.
37 Statistics Canada, Table 401-0044—Air Passenger Traffic and Flights (Annual
Numbers), GOV’T OF CAN. (2015), http://www5.statcan.gc.ca/cansim/a05?lang=
eng&id=4010044&pattern=4010044&searchTypeByValue=1&p2=35 [http://
perma.cc/R77J- X2F4].
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does not protect 5% of passengers traveling on 703 and 704 car-
riers. This leaves approximately 3.9 million domestic passengers
at risk annually every time they board a small carrier that is not
required to have SMS.38 All of the informants expressed concern
about the continued exemption of smaller air taxis and com-
muter operators from the scope of SMS. These operators are the
ones that probably require SMS the most. As the Transportation
Safety Board of Canada (TSB) has noted, “91% of all air acci-
dents and 93% of all fatalities can be attributed to the commut-
ers and air taxi operators.”39 To explain these disturbing
statistics, the TSB observed that:
Small operators typically face some interesting challenges.
They’re flying into more remote areas that may have little or no
infrastructure. They often use aircraft that are a little older, that
may not have sophisticated navigational or warning systems. The
crews will likely be on the lower end of the experience scale.40
In 2013, air taxis and commuter operators accounted for
nineteen and five fatalities respectively, whereas Canadian air-
lines did not suffer any casualties.41 Air taxi operations have ac-
counted for 175 deaths in the last ten years, which is equivalent
to 65% of all commercial aviation fatalities.42 Given that small
operators represent the greatest risk to aviation safety,43 why are
they not yet required to implement SMS?
38 TCS ENFORCEMENT OF AIR SAFETY REGULATIONS, supra note 14.
39 Air Safety Management Systems, supra note 32.
40 Id.
41 TRANSP. SAFETY BD. OF CAN., STATISTICAL SUMMARY, AVIATION OCCURRENCES
2013 (Jan. 24, 2014), http://www.bst-tsb.gc.ca/eng/stats/aviation/2013/ssea-
ssao-2013.asp [http://perma.cc/9GX7-NLRA]. Airlines suffered six accidents,
whereas commuter operators and air taxis accounted for three and eighteen acci-
dents respectively. Airlines suffered no fatal accidents, whereas air taxis and com-
muters had five and one fatal accidents respectively.
42 News Release, Transp. Safety Bd. of Can., TSB to Study Risks Associated with
Air Taxi Operations (Nov. 19, 2014), http://www.bst-tsb.gc.ca/eng/mediasmed
ia/communiques/aviation/2014/20141119.asp [http://perma.cc/SN99-QZWZ];
Air Taxis Prompt Ottawa Probe After 175 Crash Deaths, CBC NEWS (Nov. 19, 2014),
http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/air-taxis-prompt-ottawa-probe-after-175-crash-
deaths-1.2840659 [http://perma.cc/H9NS-HSSE].
43 Bruce Campion-Smith, Safety Cuts Risk Air Disaster: Judge, TORONTO STAR
(Mar. 1, 2007), http://www.thestar.com/news/2007/03/01/safety_cuts_risk_air_
disaster_judge.html [http://perma.cc/B3K3-ADWE].
2016] SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS IN CANADA 41
B. BUSINESS VS. COMPLIANCE: DOES SAFETY HAVE A PRICE?
Although the TSB has recommended that SMS should apply
to every operator regardless of its size,44 we must ask ourselves if
such a regime is even appropriate for marginal short-line opera-
tors, such as 703 and 704 carriers,45 which have minimal organi-
zational structures.46 These smaller carriers are an essential
component of Canada’s transportation network because they
serve many isolated communities in northern Canada that can-
not be reached by roads or marine transportation.47 Many of
these operations are relatively small in size; some carriers are
operated by families utilizing very informal processes; others are
one-person operations where a single individual is responsible
for everything from management to ticket sales and from pilot-
ing to servicing the aircraft.
Even if the complexity of implementing SMS were commensu-
rate with the size and complexity of each operator,48 some of the
informants49 concluded that 703 and 704 operators might not
have the resources or the expertise and knowledge to handle
the workload of SMS.50 While large airlines can accommodate
large safety expenses, small carriers operating just a few, or even
one aircraft have a very slim profit margin and can struggle at
times to make safe business decisions. Justice Virgil P. Moshan-
sky, who led the Commission of Inquiry into the Air Ontario
Crash at Dryden,51 stated that it would be a difficult task for
small “cash-strapped” carriers to monitor their own safety levels
as part of SMS.52 We can conclude that without profit, there can
be no safety in the long run.53 The Dryden experience shows
44 TRANSP. SAFETY BD. OF CAN., WATCHLIST FACT SHEET—MULTI-MODAL: SAFETY
MANAGEMENT AND OVERSIGHT (Nov. 26, 2014), http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/surveil
lance-watchlist/multi-modal/2014/multimodal.asp [http://perma.cc/2WCH-DJ
FF] [hereinafter WATCHLIST FACT SHEET—MULTI-MODAL].
45 Mark Winfield, Lac-Megantic: The Case for a Judicial Inquiry, MONTREAL GA-
ZETTE (Jan. 1, 2014), http://marksw.blog.yorku.ca/2013/12/29/lac-megantic-
the-case-for-a-judicial-inquiry-2/ [http://perma.cc/C4VU-UMLH].
46 Padova, supra note 32.
47 Sarah Schmidt, Danger Overhead: Why Transport Canada Cuts are a Red Flag for
Small Commercial Aviation Safety, OCANADA.COM (Mar. 31, 2013), http://o.canada.
com/news/national/danger-overhead-why-transport-canada-cuts-are-a-red-flag-
for-small-commercial-aviation-safety [http://perma.cc/6BZG-PX4R].
48 Canadian Aviation Regulations, SOR/1996-433 § 107.04.
49 Informants #1, #2, #3 and #4.
50 Schmidt, supra note 47.
51 MOSHANSKY, supra note 12.
52 Campion-Smith, supra note 43.
53 DEMPSEY & GOETZ, supra note 5, at 274.
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that when a State delegates the regulatory costs of safety to the
aviation industry, there is “an air of Greek tragedy about the
interaction of the de-regulatory zeitgeist with the desperate
scramble for corporate profitability.”54 Given that even large 705
carriers struggle to operate SMS, one must wonder if it is even
feasible to safely impose sophisticated safety management sys-
tems on every small operator. The complexity of SMS could in
fact exacerbate the tragic statistics associated with these carriers.
Moreover, most flight schools across the country do not even
teach SMS principles to their student pilots, which creates a
problem later on as the majority of active commercial pilots do
not understand how to operate under SMS.55 Small carriers
might “expend significant resources trying to make sense of di-
verse legal requirements, and might find it more difficult to be-
have virtuously.”56 Hence, Canadian authorities will need to
tailor SMS to the needs and operational capabilities of smaller
carriers.
Even if risk management would ultimately save money for Ca-
nadian carriers with a progressive reduction of accidents over
time,57 most informants agreed that the implementation of SMS
has a considerable initial start-up cost and requires expensive
ongoing resources to remain operational, such as additional em-
ployees to monitor SMS databases and ensure that documenta-
tion is in order.58 Not every carrier will have the same resources
or capabilities to maintain compliance with SMS. For instance,
Informant #1 was required to remove himself/herself from fly-
ing duties and sacrifice much of his/her managerial role simply
to understand, implement, and operate SMS. Instead of physi-
cally inspecting the airport premises and monitoring the actual
safety of the company, he/she had to spend much of his/her
day in an office filling out cumbersome paperwork and ensuring
that the company’s documentation was compliant with SMS reg-
ulations. Informant #3 even stated that SMS might be economi-
cally unfeasible for the average 703 and 704 operator. In
54 Robert G. Evans et al., High Reliability Versus High Autonomy: Dryden, Murphy
and Patient Safety, 1 HEALTHC. POLICY 12, 15 (2006).
55 Informant #1.
56 Richard Johnstone, Putting the Regulated Back into Regulation, 26 J. L. & SOC’Y
378, 385 (1999).
57 CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY OF NEW ZEALAND, AVIATION SAFETY MANAGEMENT
SYSTEM TRAINING REQUIREMENT 14 (2013), http://www.caa.co.za/SMS%20Docu
ments/SMS%20Training.pdf [http://perma.cc/NP5G-J38T].
58 Id. at 15.
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difficult financial times, it is hard to imagine a small carrier in-
vesting money into SMS instead of spending it on the execution
of lucrative flying contracts. In reality, the smaller carrier’s pri-
ority is to maximize its revenues and not invest in costly safety
expenses.59
While large airlines can afford to create an entire safety de-
partment monitoring SMS, smaller operators might not have
the resources to do so. During a difficult financial year, Inform-
ant #1 was forced to lay off the company’s safety officer to re-
main in business, leaving it difficult to imagine how small
carriers would be able to handle the financial burden of SMS.
Informant #1 concluded that while you cannot put a price on
safety, you can definitely put one on SMS. TC has stated that
operators will have the freedom to utilize the most cost-effective
SMS methods.60 In light of Informant #1’s experience, does that
mean that safety will become an expendable commodity for
small carriers? Recall that SMS was developed for large-scale in-
dustries characterized as “High-Reliability Organizations”
(HROs)61 such as space exploration, nuclear plants, chemical
manufacturers, deepwater oil drilling, etc.62 While major airlines
may have a similar organizational structure to such industries,
small carriers do not have such a structure and will struggle to
implement the current SMS framework. Informant #3 con-
cluded that SMS could lead to the demise of air taxis and com-
muter operators, which would have considerable consequences
for remote communities in Canada who depend on these opera-
tors for transportation and essential supplies.
Another problem is that “[s]ome smaller operators may not
commit to the cultural change that is necessary to successfully
integrate safety risk management principles and processes into
their business operations.”63 Informant #3 stated that carriers
will likely prioritize their resources toward running their opera-
59 Wayne Benedict, Canada’s Railway Safety Regulatory Regime: Past, Present & Fu-
ture, 34 TRANSP. L. J. 147, 164 (2007).
60 Valance Jones, A Serious Incident is Looming, Pilot Warns, OTTAWA COMMUNITY
NEWS (June 17, 2006), http://www.ottawacommunitynews.com/news-story/2234
772-a-serious-incident-is-looming-pilot-warns/ [http://perma.cc/5M2L-YHW4].
61 Kathleen Fox, How Has the Implementation of Safety Management Systems
(SMS) in the Transportation Industry Impacted on Risk-Management and Deci-
sion-Making? (June 2009). (unpublished Master’s thesis, Lund University) (on
file with author).
62 JAMES G. MARCH, A PRIMER ON DECISION MAKING: HOW DECISIONS HAPPEN 48
(1994); Fox, supra note 61, at 7.
63 CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY OF NEW ZEALAND, supra note 57, at 15.
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tions instead of spend their time filling out hazard identification
reports. A perfect example is the 2007 crash of a Transwest Air
Beech King Air in Saskatchewan, which killed the pilot and in-
jured three other individuals onboard.64 Even though Transwest
Air had implemented SMS and identified on several occasions
unsafe practices by its pilots, it failed to use its SMS adequately
and utilize effective corrective actions to prevent such an acci-
dent.65 This illustrates how smaller airlines manage the pres-
sures of operating a fast-paced business in small markets.66
Ultimately, flying duties have a priority over paperwork.
Indeed some operators view SMS as a superficial paper-push-
ing exercise that interferes with actual operations.67 To counter
this cynical approach, the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) has recommended that small carriers should utilize
straightforward systems with quick and effective methods, strik-
ing a balance between formal (documented) and informal sys-
tems.68 Therefore, TC will need to invest considerable efforts to
provide practical, cost-effective guidance and convince the in-
dustry that SMS will provide carriers with a downstream gain for
their business.
C. IS SMS A “SERIOUSLY MISGUIDED SYSTEM”?
All informants stated that the transition to SMS was chaotic
and lacked proper guidance from TC.69 Informant #1 asserted
that his/her experience with SMS equates to a “Seriously Mis-
guided System.” A phased implementation with four stages was in-
troduced70 to progressively adopt all ICAO standards, but the
assistance provided by authorities to Canadian carriers was said
64 TRANSP. SAFETY BD. OF CAN., AVIATION INVESTIGATION REPORT A007C0001:
COLLISION WITH TERRAIN, TRANSWEST AIR, BEECH A100 KING AIR C-GFFN, SANDY
BAY, SASKATCHEWAN, 07 JANUARY 2007 (2013) [hereinafter REPORT A007C0001].
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Neil Gunningham & Darren Sinclair, Organizational Trust and the Limits of
Management-Based Regulation, 43 L. & SOC’Y REV. 865, 880 (2009).
68 1 AIRPORT COOP. RESEARCH PROGRAM, SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS FOR AIR-
PORTS 6–7 (2007), http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/acrp/acrp_rpt_001
a.pdf [http://perma.cc/Z4RK-7MZ9].
69 Padova, supra note 32, at 6.
70 TRANSP. CAN., TP 14343E IMPLEMENTATION PROCEDURES GUIDE FOR AIR OPER-
ATORS AND APPROVED MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONS 3–4 (2005), https://www.
tc.gc.ca/eng/civilaviation/publications/tp14343-guide-3084.htm [http://perma.
cc/C9SX-DVRE].
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to be insufficient and unclear.71 TC struggled to keep up with
the industry’s implementation of SMS and postponed imple-
mentation deadlines again and again, thus seriously damaging
its credibility. The TSB has concluded that safety can be com-
promised if there are unclear implementation deadlines and im-
proper milestones for safety audit inspections;72 these
characteristics define Canada’s experience with SMS implemen-
tation. Although the Staff Instruction (SI) No. SUR-00173 pro-
vided TC inspectors with instructions on how to oversee the
implementation of SMS, the Auditor General of Canada (AGC)
concluded that these instructions insufficiently stated the mini-
mum standards and documentation required for SMS compli-
ance.74 This is because SI No. SUR-001 establishes a vague policy
with subjective guidelines and does not provide TC or carriers
with clear and objective legal standards.75 SMS policies were
amended numerous times and consequently lacked clarity and
consistency. Every informant stated that standards varied enor-
mously across the country. Informant #1 stated that while one
carrier would find its 300-page SMS manual being rejected with-
out any feedback, another carrier’s 10-page manual would ap-
proved, even though both carriers had a similar operational
structure.76
The AGC also concluded that most TC inspectors did not fully
understand the SMS methodology and, therefore, did not con-
duct their duties according to the recommended surveillance
methodology.77 It was further found that inspectors did not have
adequate training or sufficient experience, or both, with SMS to
actually provide accurate advice to carriers across the country.78
In fact, only 40% of inspectors had received SMS training by
71 ICAO, Report of the Seventeenth Meeting of the AFI Planning and Implementation
Regional Group, ICAO Doc. APIRG/17 (2010).
72 News Release, Transp. Safety Bd. of Can., Effective Oversight Vital to Avia-
tion Safety, Says the TSB (Nov. 10, 2009), http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/medias-me
dia/communiques/aviation/2009/comm_a07a0134.asp [http://perma.cc/4Q9
N-8DNQ].
73 TRANSP. CAN., STAFF INSTRUCTION NO. SUR-001, SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURES
(2010) [hereinafter SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURES].
74 OVERSIGHT OF CIVIL AVIATION REPORT, supra note 14, at 19, 29.
75 SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURES, supra note 73. The instruction orders TC inspec-
tors not to make subjective statements, suggestions, or recommendations in the
audit reports for the SMS of carriers.
76 Informant #1.
77 OVERSIGHT OF CIVIL AVIATION REPORT, supra note 14, at 21.
78 Id.
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2011.79 These criticisms were evident in the interviews with in-
formants. For example, Informant #2 was told by an inspector to
consult Wikipedia to learn about SMS. While carriers were strug-
gling to understand how to implement SMS, it was clear for
some informants that even TC itself did not understand SMS or
how it should be adapted to aviation. Informants noted that TC
was learning about SMS at the same time the airlines were trying
to implement it, which caused significant implementation dis-
parities across the industry. Coupled with a lack of proper inves-
tigative methodology, TC inspectors were struggling to provide
carriers with official documents stating the minimum standards
for obtaining the approval of their SMS.80 Consequently, TC was
not able to provide constructive feedback to assist carriers in in-
troducing SMS into their operations. Overall, informants found
it difficult to afford SMS any credibility because of TC’s confu-
sion throughout the implementation process. How can the in-
dustry buy into such regulation if the regulator does not seem to
understand what it is doing? SMS was not sold well to the indus-
try. It was prematurely launched and inadequately supported. As
a result, the industry has struggled to invest any trust into this
new regime.
III. TRANSPORT CANADA’S DEREGULATION OF FLIGHT
SAFETY: A DANGEROUS FLIGHT PATH
A. TRANSPORT CANADA’S FAILURE TO UPHOLD ITS OVERSIGHT
RESPONSIBILITIES
Paul Dempsey has eloquently stated: “Law without compliance
and enforcement is like poetry—it is pleasing to the ear, but has
little to do with the practical world in which we live.”81 He fur-
ther asserted that ubiquitous surveillance of the industry serves
the public interest by ensuring safe and dependable air ser-
vices.82 The Moshansky Inquiry insisted that enforcement is a
key element of an effective governmental safety program.83 In
79 Id. at 23.
80 Id. at 22.
81 Paul Stephen Dempsey, Compliance & Enforcement in International Law: Achiev-
ing Global Uniformity in Aviation Safety, 30 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 1, 2 (2004).
82 PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY & LAURENCE E. GESELL, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE REG-
ULATION OF COMMERCIAL AVIATION 98 (2013) [hereinafter PUBLIC POLICY].
83 The Honorable Virgil P. Moshansky & Donald L. Van Dyke, The Role of the
Judiciary in Aviation Safety: The Inside Story and Legacy of Dryden (Oct. 16, 2007)
(presented at the International Civil Aviation Organization), http://www.system-
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accordance with articles 12 and 37 of the Chicago Convention,84
States have the obligation to ensure the safety oversight of inter-
national transportation conducted within its airspace.85 Jiefang
Huang argued that State oversight is an essential component of
the erga omnes nature of safety as an international law obliga-
tion.86 Since “the safety oversight function of one State will have
impact upon another State,”87 there exists a natural relationship
between effective oversight and humanitarian considerations.
Under Annex 19, Canada must develop a framework for a
State Safety Programme (SSP),88 which complements existing
oversight duties. Similar to an air carrier’s SMS requirements, it
must develop a legislative framework, a safety policy for the in-
dustry, industry risk management measures, safety assurance
programs and a State safety promotion program. In other
words, an SSP is a government’s internal safety management sys-
tem overseeing the entire industry’s safety. One of the funda-
mental objectives of an SSP is that it must provide appropriate
State oversight,89 ensuring continued compliance with national
regulations established in accordance with ICAO SARPs. It must
provide surveillance activities and safety monitoring through 1)
paperwork audits and 2) physical inspections.90
Despite the fact that SMS was intended to introduce an addi-
tional layer of safety to existing oversight duties,91 Canada can-
celed its National Audit Program (NAP) in 2006,92 which
previously provided for operational and physical inspections of
safety.org/chapters/sites/canada/meetings/presentations/RAeSLecture_Judi
cialRolesE.pdf [http://perma.cc/Y6CW-TTYU].
84 ICAO, Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention)
art. 12, 37, Dec. 7, 1944, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter Chicago Convention].
85 Id.; ICAO, Safety Oversight Manual—Part A: The Establishment & Management of
a State’s Safety Oversight System, ICAO Doc. 9734-AN/959 (2d ed. 2006).
86 Jiefang Huang, Aviation Safety, ICAO and Obligations Erga Omnes, 8 CHIN. J.
INT. L. 63, 63–79 (2009); Mikolaj Ratajcyk, Regulatory Framework for a “Performance-
Based” Approach to Air Safety Management in the European Union, 36 AIR SPACE L.
401, 402 (2011).
87 Huang, supra note 86, at 73; JIEFANG HUANG, AVIATION SAFETY THROUGH THE
RULE OF LAW: ICAO’S MECHANISMS AND PRACTICES 5 (2009).
88 Annex 19, supra note 16.
89 IMPLEMENTING SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS IN AVIATION 261 (Alan J. Stolzer
et al., eds., 2011).
90 Assembly Res. 36-13, supra note 17, at 4–7.
91 Hearing on Aviation Safety & Security Before the Standing Comm. on Transp., In-
frastructure & Cmtys., 40th Parl., 7th Meeting (2010) (Can.) [hereinafter Hearing
on Safety & Security].
92 TRANSP. CAN., CIVIL AVIATION DIRECTIVE (CAD) NO. 39, AVIATION ENFORCE-
MENT—SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS (2005).
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airlines, including airplane maintenance inspections, pilot
check-rides, unannounced ramp checks, etc. Subsequently, TC
ordered its inspectors to cancel all enforcement actions and ter-
minate any ongoing investigations concerning SMS certificate
holders.93 Instead, pre-announced paperwork assessments and
program validation inspections (PVIs) focusing on the airline’s
SMS are now the primary oversight tools utilized by TC.94 As
part of SMS, TC has openly stated that “the responsibility for
regulatory oversight will now rest with the aviation industry and
that [TC] will conduct audits based on risk factors.”95 A Safety
Management Advisor at ICAO stated before the Parliament of
Canada that replacing hands-on inspections with paperwork au-
dits would diminish the industry’s overall safety, since this would
not respect ICAO’s requirement to continue providing sched-
uled and random safety inspections.96 Several informants were
convinced that the level of safety in Canada had been drastically
reduced since the inception of SMS as traditional inspections in
the past ensured carriers were conforming to safety regula-
tions.97 Based on the cancelation of the NAP, it would seem that
since TC inspectors have begun conducting paperwork SMS au-
dits instead of physically inspecting airplanes, the regulator has
not been providing effective responses to actual industry
hazards.
Under TC’s current safety regime, the Canadian Federal Pi-
lots Association (CFPA) stated that the shift toward paper-based
oversight duties has left the traveling public vulnerable to a ma-
jor aviation accident.98 Safety is essential to ensuring that avia-
tion remains a sustainable and efficient mode of
93 Moshansky & Van Dyke, supra note 83.
94 Sarah Schmidt, Are Big Jets as Safe as We Think? Some Canadian Experts Say No,
OCANADA.COM (Apr. 1, 2013), http://o.canada.com/uncategorized/are-big-jets-
as-safe-as-we-think-some-canadian-experts-say-no [http://perma.cc/YZJ5-6EHQ].
95 Kelly McParland, Transport Canada Fears Ending Regular Airline Safety Audits
Could be Risky, NAT’L POST (Oct. 1, 2011), http://www.nationalpost.com/news/
story.html?id=1a70a2e3-8401-4cc6-850e-ff973d9b0739&k=83029 [http://perma.
cc/UM7E-QBF8].
96 Hearing on Bill C-6, 40th Meeting, supra note 15.
97 Jones, supra note 60.
98 Aviation Inspectors Condemn Transport Canada’s Safety System Warn of Impending
Major Accident, UNION OF CANADIAN TRANSP. EMPS. (Apr. 24, 2014), http://www.
ucte.ca/?p=2479 [http://perma.cc/CJ6C-U7AZ]; Kathryn Blaze Carlson, Survey
Finds Gaps in Aviation Safety Procedures, GLOBE & MAIL (Apr. 24, 2014), http://
www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/survey-finds-gaps-in-aviation-safety-pro
cedures/article18136511/ [http://perma.cc/Z62R-3RJK].
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transportation.99 Removing regulatory oversight threatens the vi-
ability of the entire safety regime. In addition, since adequate
oversight is an overriding priority for ICAO,100 Canada is in clear
contravention of Annex 19’s recommendation to continue pro-
viding traditional safety inspections in addition to the new SMS
paperwork audits.101 Greg Holbrook, the National Chair of the
CFPA, stated that TC has dismantled the traditional regulatory
oversight role responsible for Canada’s relatively low accident
rate, in exchange for system evaluations, thus shifting the focus
from actual operations to paper and policy.102 For example, be-
cause cumbersome paperwork prevented Informant #1 from ef-
fectively tackling safety concerns in his/her daily work activities,
his/her operation saw its near-perfect safety record erode away
with a substantial increase in the number of accidents during
what this informant described as a “precarious” implementation
process. In a similar vein, Air Canada observed: “We are con-
cerned that this approach (SMS) has lost its way and is en-
gendering a culture of ‘paper safety’ at the expense of real
safety.”103
This is a dangerous strategy as SMS safety audits can rapidly
degenerate into a meaningless “tick-a-box” exercise.104 Most in-
formants agreed that it is possible to reap the benefits of SMS
only if the previous oversight regime is reinstated in combina-
tion with these new SMS audits. Under a different SI, govern-
ment inspectors only have to evaluate the effectiveness of an
airline’s SMS and have become system evaluators instead of ef-
fectively monitoring the actual operational safety levels of Cana-
dian airlines.105 Informant #3 argued that, in effect, TC has
illegally abdicated its safety responsibilities and has failed to up-
hold its statutory oversight obligations under the Aeronautics
99 Mark Kinzie, Aviation: the Rule for Admissibility: Building a Balance Between the
Interests of Air Safety and the Interests of Aviation Litigation, 41 OKLA. L. REV. 265, 265
(1988).
100 Michael Milde, Enforcement of Aviation Safety Standards—Problems of Safety
Oversight, 45 Z. LUFT-UN WELTRAUMRECHT 2, 2 (1996); Dempsey, supra note 81, at
30.
101 Annex 19, supra note 16.
102 An Act to Amend the Aeronautics Act and to Make Consequential Amendments to
Other Acts: Hearing on Bill C-6 Before the Standing Comm. on Transp., Infrastructure &
Cmtys., 39th Parl., 37th Meeting (2007) (Can.) [hereinafter Hearing on Bill C-6,
37th Meeting].
103 Schmidt, supra note 94.
104 Andrew Hopkins, Beyond Compliance Monitoring: New Strategies for Safety Regu-
lators, 29 L. & POL’Y 210, 213 (2007).
105 SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURES, supra note 73.
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Act.106 For Informant #4, it is apparent that safety oversight du-
ties have been delegated to the industry itself.107 Members of
Parliament even stated that:
Our concern is having the airlines establish regulations and gov-
ern themselves. We just don’t think in this competitive, commer-
cial environment of the airline industry anywhere in the world
that this is a good way to go right now. Maybe later on, when we
can have that safety culture established, but right now we don’t
have a safety culture.108
A strong oversight system is a necessary prerequisite for SMS
and without a healthy and mature regulatory surveillance pro-
gram already established, States will struggle to harvest any ben-
efits from SMS.109 This is because States must become a dynamic
factor in the industry’s overall safety culture and demonstrate a
strong commitment toward safety with their continued presence
in the surveillance of aviation. Evidently, Canada has embarked
on a completely different path, which is endangering the travel-
ing public.
B. THE CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE: DEREGULATION OR SELF-
REGULATION?
Despite the fact that SMS was meant to further regulate civil
aviation, there is an overwhelming paradox as we realize how
TC’s implementation of SMS has, in practice, effectively deregu-
lated flight safety in several aspects. Although Canada is not the
only country struggling with adequate oversight,110 it has for-
feited optimal safety by eliminating TC’s regulatory safety in-
spections. Indeed, TC abandoned its inspection program even
before SMS implementation had been completed for 705 carri-
106 Aeronautics Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. A-2 4.2 (Can.); Canwest News Serv., Trans-
port Investigator Calls of Aviation Safety Inquiry, OCANADA.COM (Feb. 28, 2007),
http://www.canada.com/story.html?id=56bc4176-49a8-4292-b09e-decf5b17c5bd
[http://perma.cc/ZD9L-M4LB].
107 Air Safety Regulation on “The Current”, CBC RADIO (May 13, 2014), http://
www.safeskies.ca/news/current_air_safety [http://perma.cc/5BHF-A44K].
108 Hearing on Bill C-6, 37th Meeting, supra note 102.
109 Ratajcyk, supra note 86, at 406.
110 John Saba, Aviation Safety in Crisis: The Option of The International Financial
Facility for Aviation Safety (IFFAS), 1 TRANSP. L. J. 1 (2002); John Saba, Worldwide
Safe Flight: Will the International Financial Facility for Aviation Safety Help it Happen?,
68 J. AIR L. & COM. 537, 542 (2003); CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTH., SAFETY MAN-
AGEMENT SYSTEMS: WHAT’S IN IT FOR YOU? 13 (2002) (Austl.), http://www.caa.lv/
upload/userfiles/files/SMS/CASA/CASA%20Whats%20in%20it%20for%20you
%20sms1.pdf [http://perma.cc/UK3W-JJR8].
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ers, which temporarily left the industry with minimal safeguards.
In 2014, the CFPA conducted a survey of TC’s aviation inspec-
tors regarding Canada’s SMS safety regime. The survey revealed
the following concerns regarding the risks created by SMS to the
traveling public:
• Effective oversight, other than in an administrative man-
ner, is practically non-existent.
• “Nine-in-ten aviation inspectors report that [TC’s] SMS
prevents the correction of safety problems in a timely fash-
ion . . . .
• 84% of aviation inspectors expect a major aviation acci-
dent or incident in the near future after working in an
SMS environment for the past seven years, up from 74%
who held this view in 2007.
• Two-thirds (67%) believe [TC’s] SMS will actually increase
the chances of a major aviation accident or incident, up
slightly from 2007 when 61% held this view.
• 85% of respondents believe air travellers have been ex-
posed to higher risk as a result of [TC’s] aviation SMS, up
significantly from 2007 when 67% forecast this
outcome.”111
Given that some airlines can now go uninspected with a PVI
for up to five years under the new SMS regime,112 many promi-
nent aviation experts, including Justice Moshansky, have argued
that the SMS approach adopted by TC might constitute self-regu-
lation,113 and reflects what has been described as a neoliberal
111 Aviation Inspectors Condemn Transport Canada’s Safety System, supra note 98;
Press Release, Canadian Fed. Pilots Assoc. (CFPA), Aviation Inspectors Condemn
Transport Canada’s Safety System Warn of Impending Major Accident (Apr. 24,
2014), http://www.cfpa-apfc.ca/wp-content/uploads/2015/en/Abacus_release.
pdf [http://perma.cc/Z43N-24QX].
112 Aviation Inspectors Condemn Transport Canada’s Safety System, supra note 98;
Aviation Inspectors Raise “Red Flag” over Airline Safety, CBC NEWS (Apr. 24, 2014,
12:57 PM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/aviation-inspectors-raise-red-flag-
over-airline-safety-1.2620472 [http://perma.cc/Q8F6-KKAA].
113 David McKie, Critics Slam Changes to Aircraft Safety Inspection System, CBC
NEWS (Sept. 2, 2008, 5:10 AM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/critics-slam-changes-to-
aircraft-safety-inspection-system-1.698546 [http://perma.cc/47KV-K4AB]; An Act
to Amend the Aeronautics Act and to Make Consequential Amendments to Other Acts:
Hearing on Bill C-6 Before the Standing Comm. on Transp., Infrastructure & Cmtys.,
39th Parl., 39th Meeting (2007) (Can.) [hereinafter Hearing on Bill C-6, 39th
Meeting].
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approach to safety oversight.114 Although Alfred Kahn asserted
that authorities never deregulated safety during the economic
deregulation of the airline market in the late 1980s,115 many be-
lieve that those operating with SMS are left policing safety them-
selves.116 TC stated “that this assessment is common but not
accurate, given that the SMS requirements are themselves regu-
lations and that no regulations have been removed since SMS
was introduced.”117 But if one reads TC’s actual policy statement
regarding SMS, it is difficult to see how SMS does not constitute
self-regulation:
[TC] agrees to promote voluntary compliance with regulatory re-
quirements, without necessarily resorting to punitive action, by provid-
ing certificate holders governed by an SMS, the opportunity to
determine, by themselves, proposed corrective measures to prevent
recurrence of a contravention, as well as the best course of action
to help foster future compliance.118
Even if SMS does not constitute safety deregulation in the-
ory,119 informants #3 and #5 both concluded that it has that ef-
fect in practice. Some members of Parliament have agreed that
TC promotes a “hands-off” policy, which forces inspectors to rely
on the good graces of airlines to police their own operations
and voluntarily report non-compliance.120 Justice Moshansky has
even asserted that he does not believe “that SMS, without effec-
tive regulatory oversight, would have prevented the accident at
Dryden.”121 Informant #2 argued that TC’s policy is similar to
telling an automobile driver that police officers will not monitor
114 Bertrand Schepper, Les effets de la de´re´glementation sur la trage´die de Lac-Me´gan-
tic (Oct. 22, 2013), http://iris-recherche.qc.ca/blogue/les-effets-de-la-deregle
mentation-sur-la-tragedie-de-lac-megantic [http://perma.cc/4LQM-NBHP].
115 PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 82, at 961; The Legacy of Airline Deregulation, PBS
NEWSHOUR (Jan. 9, 2003), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/transportation-jan-
june03-airlines_1-9/ [http://perma.cc/J8WL-L5AJ].
116 Benedict, supra note 59, at 159; Schepper, supra note 114.
117 Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Standing Committee on Trans-
portation, Infrastructure & Communities, Interim Report on Rail Safety Review, 41st
Parl, 2nd Sess (June 2014) (Chair: Larry Miller) at 13, http://www.parl.gc.ca/con
tent/hoc/committee/412/tran/reports/rp6669729/tranrp03/tranrp03-e.pdf
[http://perma.cc/WS6U-GF5J] [hereinafter Interim Report on Rail Safety Review].
118 TRANSP. CAN., CIVIL AVIATION DIRECTIVE (CAD) NO. 107-004, AVIATION EN-
FORCEMENT— SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS (2009) [hereinafter CAD NO. 107-
004] (emphasis added).
119 Fox, supra note 61, at 15; Ruwantissa Abeyratne, Investing in Air Transport—
A Prudent Move?, 34 TRANSP. L.J. 327, 343 (2007).
120 Hearing on Safety & Security, supra note 91.
121 Hearing on Bill C-6, 40th Meeting, supra note 15.
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the speed limits anymore, but if he drives over the speed limit,
he should turn himself in to receive his speeding ticket.122 Even
if a carrier voluntarily reports a violation, it may not face any
sanction. TC’s Civil Aviation Directive (CAD) No. 107-004123 states
that if a carrier commits a serious violation of the Canadian Avi-
ation Regulations (CARs)124 (e.g., a company pilot flying with an
expired certificationer lands an aircraft without clearance), re-
ports it, and provides a corrective action, it will have complied
with SMS regulations and preempt any enforcement action by
TC.125 Consequently, a carrier may not in theory be sanctioned
by TC, even for serious violations, as long as there is no evidence
of negligence.126 By abdicating enforcement strategies, some
have even argued that TC is granting airlines a “Get-Out-of-Jail
Free Card.”127 How is that not self-regulation?
This is a preposterous approach since the motivations of air-
lines to comply with safety requirements include the deterring
effect of regulatory surveillance, rather than impartial altru-
ism.128 The best way to encourage safety for airlines is to provide
them with an incentive to comply with the law (e.g., compliance
with proactive SMS reporting) balanced with a disincentive to
violate the law, such as regular surveillance activities, to keep
carriers on the lookout for safety deviations.129 Most informants
agreed that we cannot rely entirely on the system’s self-regula-
tion. Regulatory inspections should be reinstated since these are
more assertive and effective.130
122 Flight Policy Change Called a Risky Manoeuvre, CBC NEWS (Nov. 9, 2011),
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/flight-policy-change-called-a-risky-manoeuvre-
1.1087729 [http://perma.cc/4JN4-W474].
123 CAD NO. 107-004, supra note 118.
124 Canadian Aviation Regulations, SOR/1996-433 § 705.153(1)(a).
125 TRANSP. CAN., STAFF INSTRUCTION NO. SUR-006, SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYS-
TEMS—CIVIL AVIATION NON-COMPLIANCE EVENT REVIEW (2010) [hereinafter
SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS REVIEW]; CAD NO. 107-004, supra note 118, at Ap-
pendix A.
126 SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS REVIEW, supra note 125.
127 An Act to Amend the Aeronautics Act and to Make Consequential Amendments to
Other Acts: Hearing on Bill C-6 Before the Standing Comm. on Transp., Infrastructure &
Cmtys., 39th Parl., 56th Meeting (2007) (Can.).
128 See Hopkins, supra note 104, at 219; Gunningham & Sinclair, supra note 67,
at 869.
129 See Dennis L. Bryant, The Maritime Compliance Program: Foghorn Protection for
the Shipowner, 24 TUL. MAR. L. J. 591, 592 (2000).
130 Ruwantissa Abeyratne, Prevention of Controlled Flight into Terrain: Regulatory
and Legal Aspects, 27 TRANSP. L. J. 159, 172 (2000).
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All informants agreed that SMS was partly implemented as a
cost-saving measure by TC to reduce the number of inspectors
in the field. Hence, the financial burden of safety has almost
entirely shifted to the airlines.131 This is a dangerous strategy
because in the balance of profitability versus safety, the Dryden
accident has demonstrated that cash-strapped airlines will likely
prioritize profitability.132 Alfred Kahn stated that the intensive
competition in the post-deregulation era might have the adverse
effect of forcing airlines to cut corners on safety.133 We can con-
clude that managing economic competition and safety concerns
simultaneously can generate a deadly conflict of interest for air-
lines.134 The AGC even concluded that TC “is not adequately
managing the risks associated with its civil aviation oversight.”135
This is mainly because TC has not established a minimum ac-
ceptable level of surveillance, leaving it to each airline to set its
own safety standards.136
Presently, TC is not even close to having enough safety inspec-
tors to ensure appropriate levels of safety.137 TC currently em-
ploys around 850 safety inspectors, well short of the 1,400
employed during the Dryden accident and the 1,800 inspectors
recommended by the Dryden Inquiry.138 The low number of in-
spectors policing the airlines can be interpreted as another ex-
ample of self-regulation in practice. Thus, sufficient oversight
must start with increasing the number of inspectors available to
oversee the industry. Considering that TC is “uniquely placed as
one of the potentially most effective [defenses] against [organi-
zational] accident,”139 direct interventionism through systematic
safety inspections will afford the industry, and more importantly
the traveling public, with a critical safety defense. In light of this,
131 See Moshansky & Van Dyke, supra note 83, at 2.3.4.1.
132 Id.
133 See Alfred Kahn, Airline Deregulation—A Mixed Bag, but a Clear Success Never-
theless, 16 TRANSP. L. J. 229, 249, 245, 251; PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 82, at 697.
134 See Benedict, supra note 59, at 164; P.J. VANDERGEEST ET AL., NAT’L AERO-
SPACE LABORATORY NLR, AVIATION SAFETY MANAGEMENT IN SWITZERLAND: RECOV-
ERING FROM THE MYTH OF PERFECTION 64 (2003), www.nlr-atsi.nl/downloads/
aviation-safety-management-in-switzerland.pdf [http://perma.cc/Q26L-CFRF].
135 See OVERSIGHT OF CIVIL AVIATION REPORT, supra note 14, at 28.
136 See Hearing on Bill C-6, 39th Meeting, supra note 113, at 3.
137 See OVERSIGHT OF CIVIL AVIATION REPORT, supra note 14, at 25.
138 See An Act to Amend the Aeronautics Act and to Make Consequential Amendments
to Other Acts: Hearing on Bill C-6 Before the Standing Comm. on Transp., Infrastructure
& Cmtys., 39th Parl., 45th Meeting (2007) (Can.) [hereinafter Hearing on Bill C-6,
45th Meeting].
139 VANDERGEEST ET AL., supra note 134, at 17.
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Canada should listen to ICAO’s recommendation advising mem-
ber States to have a high-level political commitment toward
oversight and adequate resources to fulfill their aviation safety-
related responsibilities.140
IV. UNCOVERING THE DEADLY CONSEQUENCES OF
SAFETY DEREGULATION
A. A DEADLY LEARNING CURVE—BREAKING THE MYTH OF
PERFECTION
Several investigation reports have demonstrated that inade-
quate oversight can be a causal factor to major accidents141—Air
Ontario Flight 1363 was a perfect example. While TC continues
to boast about Canada’s impeccable safety record,142 its compla-
cency and misconception about the inherent risks associated
with aviation has led to a lack of awareness of the industry’s ac-
tual risks.143 Seven recent accident investigation reports from
the TSB concerning carriers with SMS processes in place have
commented on the industry’s challenging and sometimes deadly
transition to SMS.144 In all of these accident reports, SMS
140 See ICAO, Safety Oversight Manual, supra note 85, at 1–1.
141 See VANDERGEEST ET AL., supra note 134, at 100; Moshansky & Van Dyke,
supra note 83, at 1.5.1.4.
142 See Hearing on Bill C-6, 45th Meeting, supra note 138, at 12.
143 See Jacqueline L. Weaver, Offshore Safety in the Wake of the Macondo Disaster:
Business as Usual or Sea Change?, 36 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 147, 164 (2014).
144 TRANSP. SAFETY BD. OF CAN., AVIATION INVESTIGATION REPORT A11A0035:
RUNWAY OVERRUN, KELOWNA FLIGHTCRAFT AIR CHARTER LTD., BOEING 727-281, C-
GKFJ, ST. JOHN’S, NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR, 16 JULY 2011, at 28–29 (2013)
[hereinafter REPORT A11A0035]; TRANSP. SAFETY BD. OF CAN., AVIATION INVESTI-
GATION REPORT A11O0031: ERRONEOUS AIR DATA INDICATIONS, SUNWING AIRLINES
INC., BOEING 737-8Q8, C-FTAH, TORONTO–LESTER B. PEARSON INTERNATIONAL
AIRPORT, TORONTO, ONTARIO, 13 MARCH 2011, at 10–13, 20 (2013) [hereinafter
REPORT A11O0031]; TRANSP. SAFETY BD. OF CAN., AVIATION INVESTIGATION RE-
PORT A11F0012: PITCH EXCURSION, AIR CANADA, BOEING, 767-333, C-GHLQ,
NORTH ATLANTIC OCEAN, 55°00’N 029°00’W, 14 JANUARY 2011, at 16 (2013)
[hereinafter REPORT A11F0012]; TRANSP. SAFETY BD. OF CAN., AVIATION INVESTIGA-
TION REPORT A09A0016: MAIN GEARBOX MALFUNCTION/COLLISION WITH WATER,
COUGAR HELICOPTERS INC., SIKORSKY S-92A, C-GZCH, ST. JOHN’S, NEWFOUNDLAND
AND LABRADOR, 35 NM E, 12 MARCH 2009, at 50 (2013) [hereinafter REPORT
A09A0016]; TRANSP. SAFETY BD. OF CAN., AVIATION INVESTIGATION REPORT
A07A0134: TOUCHDOWN SHORT OF RUNWAY, JETPORT INC. BOMBARDIER BD-700-
1A11 (GLOBAL 5000), C-GXPR, FOX HARBOUR AERODROME, NOVA SCOTIA, 11 NO-
VEMBER 2007, at 27–32 (2013) [hereinafter REPORT A07A0134]; REPORT
A007C0001, supra note 64, at 22, 32; TRANSP. SAFETY BD. OF CAN., AVIATION INVES-
TIGATION REPORT A11H0002: CONTROLLED FLIGHT INTO TERRIAN, BRADLEY AIR
SERVICES LIMITED (FIRST AIR), BOEING 737-210C, C-GNWN RESOLUTE BAY,
NUNAVUT, 20 AUGUST 2011, at 50 (2014) [hereinafter REPORT A11H0002].
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processes failed partially or systematically, and TC was not able
to properly identify these deficiencies with operational inspec-
tions.145 In the deadly crash of First Air Flight 6560,146 for in-
stance, the airline’s inadequate cockpit resource management
(CRM) training was not identified by TC due to a lack of on-site
inspections to verify compliance with regulatory training re-
quirements.147 Some of these accidents could have been pre-
vented if TC had eyes in the field monitoring the actual safety
performance of these carriers instead of reading over the air-
line’s paperwork. To this effect, the TSB stated in its 2014
Watchlist that:
SMS on its own is not enough . . . . That’s why we are calling on
TC to regularly oversee all safety management systems and
processes to ensure they are effective. And when transportation
companies are unable to effectively manage safety, TC must in-
tervene in a way that succeeds in changing unsafe operating
practices.148
Evidence demonstrating the insufficient level of safety over-
sight provided by TC is reflected in several TSB reports. In 2001,
the TSB concluded that in certain areas of commercial opera-
tions, such as with smaller operators in remote areas of the
country, “the safety oversight efforts of TC have been somewhat
ineffective” and “there is a deficiency in TC’s safety oversight
program.”149 TSB concluded in the investigation reports for two
fatal crashes that TC’s poor level of safety oversight was a direct
contributing factor to the accidents themselves.150 In its 2012 Avia-
145 REPORT A11A0035, supra note 144; REPORT A11O0031, supra note 144; RE-
PORT A011F0012, supra note 144; REPORT A09A0016, supra note 144; REPORT
A07A0134, supra note 144; REPORT A007C001, supra note 64; REPORT A11H0002,
supra note 144.
146 First Air Flight 6560 crashed while on final approach to land in Resolute
Bay, Nunavut, Canada, in 2011, killing twelve people and seriously injuring four
other individuals on board. Carlson, supra note 98.
147 See REPORT A11H0002, supra note 144.
148 News Release, Transp. Safety Bd. of Can., TSB’s 2014 Watchlist Highlights
Eight Significant Transportation Safety Issues (Nov. 26, 2014), http://tsb.gc.ca/
eng/medias-media/communiques/autres-other/2014/20141126.asp [http://
perma.cc/AG88-4ETW].
149 TRANSP. SAFETY BD. OF CAN., REASSESSMENT OF THE RESPONSES FROM TRANS-
PORT CANADA TO AVIATION SAFETY RECOMMENDATION A01-01 (REGULATORY SAFETY
OVERSIGHT) (2014).
150 See TRANSP. SAFETY BD. OF CAN., AVIATION INVESTIGATION REPORT A10Q0117:
LOSS OF CONTROL AND COLLISION WITH TERRAIN, NORDAIR QUE´BEC 2000 INC., DE
HAVILLAND DHC-2 MK. 1 C-FGYK, LA GRANDE-RIVIE`RE AIRPORT, QUE´BEC, 24 JULY
2010, at 12 (2013); TRANSP. SAFETY BD. OF CAN., AVIATION INVESTIGATION REPORT
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tion Watchlist, the TSB stated that TC “does not always provide
effective oversight of aviation companies transitioning to safety
management systems, while some companies are not even re-
quired to have one. . . . [TC] must effectively monitor the inte-
gration of SMS practices into day-to-day operations.”151
In one instance, TSB concluded that TC’s ineffective surveil-
lance did not ensure regulatory compliance and subsequently
allowed unsafe practices to persist.152 Moreover, TC’s surveil-
lance of business aircraft operating under the Canadian Busi-
ness Aviation Association (CBAA) was deemed to be inadequate
in the investigation of the 2007 crash of a Jetport Inc. Bombar-
dier Global Express in Fox Harbour, Nova Scotia.153 Ineffective
oversight of SMS does not have exclusive boundaries in the avia-
tion industry and is a cancer that is now spreading to marine
and rail transportation, as illustrated by some recent accident
reports.154
B. Air Me´gantic—An Accident Waiting to Happen
Although SMS has yet to contribute to a tragic meltdown of
aviation safety, the TSB’s concerns for the safety of transporta-
tion materialized in 2013 when a Montreal, Maine & Atlantic
Railway (MMA) train carrying crude oil derailed in the town of
Lac-Me´gantic and caused a massive explosion, killing 47 people
and destroying most of the city’s downtown core.155 Since 2001,
commercial railway operators in Canada have been required to
A10Q0098: ENGINE PROBLEM—COLLISION WITH TERRAIN, AE´ROPERO (2550-4330
QUE´BEC INC.), BEECHCRAFT A100 KING AIR C-FGIN, QUE´BEC, QUEBEC, 23 JUNE
2010, at 41 (2014).
151 TRANSP. SAFETY BD. OF CAN., WATCHLIST FACT SHEET—AIR: AIR SAFETY MAN-
AGEMENT SYSTEMS (2012).
152 See REPORT A07A0134, supra note 144, at 57.
153 See id.
154 See, e.g., TRANSP. SAFETY BD. OF CAN., MARINE INVESTIGATION REPORT
M12C0058: GROUNDING, ROLL-ON/ROLL-OFF PASSENGER VESSEL JIIMAAN, AP-
PROACHING KINGSVILLE HARBOUR, ONTARIO, 11 OCTOBER 2012, at 19–23 (2014);
TRANSP. SAFETY BD. OF CAN., RAILWAY INVESTIGATION REPORT R06V0136: RUN-
AWAY/DERAILMENT CANADIAN NATIONAL FREIGHT TRAIN L-567-51-29, MILE 184.8,
LILLOOET SUBDIVISION NEAR LILLOOET, BRITISH COLUMBIA, 29 JUNE 2006, at 49
(2013); News Release, Transp. Safety Bd. of Can., TSB is Concerned About TC
Oversight of New Passenger Safety Regulations as Part of Jiimaan Grounding In-
vestigation (Mar. 10, 2014), http://www.bst-tsb.gc.ca/eng/medias-media/com-
muniques/marine/2014/m12c0058-20140310.asp [http://perma.cc/6B6Q-
XDAU].
155 TIMELINE: Lac-Me´gantic Rail Disaster, CBC NEWS (Oct. 7, 2013), http://
www.cbc.ca/news2/interactives/timeline-lac-megantic/ [http://perma.cc/VH8J-
FENP].
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have a functional SMS in place.156 In its final investigation re-
port, the TSB concluded that TC had failed to provide adequate
oversight of MMA’s deficient SMS and that this was a causal fac-
tor contributing to the accident for the following reasons:157
• TC did not follow up on recurring safety deficiencies at
MMA and did not ensure that proper risk management
measures were put in place to correct serious problems.
Consequently, unsafe practices persisted.158
• SMS systems audits by TC were limited and their scope was
inadequate.159
• TC did not conduct any follow-up actions to ensure that
the operator was implementing the recommended correc-
tive actions. Consequently, systemic weaknesses in the SMS
were not addressed.160
• There is a heightened risk that operators will not manage
safety effectively without proper and recurrent SMS audits
by TC.161
• TC does not sufficiently monitor the overall national
safety. TC’s regional offices cannot guarantee that the
public’s safety is protected in every region and ensure that
the risks to the public are being properly managed.162
We can draw several similarities between the TSB’s conclu-
sions in the Lac-Me´gantic accident investigation report with the
current level of safety in aviation. If these similarities are not
urgently corrected in the aviation industry, it is only a matter of
time before a carrier’s negligent use of SMS processes contrib-
utes to a fatal accident.163 We should not ask ourselves if we will
have our own “Air Me´gantic” in the aviation industry, but rather
156 See Railway Safety Management System Regulations, SOR/2001-37, repealed
and replaced by Railway Safety Management System Regulations, SOR/2015-26
§ 89 (Can.).
157 TRANSP. SAFETY BD. OF CAN., RAILWAY INVESTIGATION REPORT R13D0054:
RUNAWAY AND MAIN-TRACK DERAILMENT, MONTREAL, MAIN & ATLANTIC RAILWAY,
FREIGHT TRAIN MMA-002, MILE 0.23, SHERBROOKE SUBDIVISION, LAC-ME´GANTIC,




161 Id. at 131.
162 Id.
163 Amber Hildebrandt, Transport Canada’s Lax Safety Regime Goes Beyond Rail,
CBC NEWS (Aug. 21, 2014), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/transport-canada-s-
lax-safety-regime-goes-beyond-rail-1.2741610 [http://perma.cc/6DFN-95MW].
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when and where.164 Will it require a large airliner to crash in a
major Canadian city like Montre´al or Toronto before the gov-
ernment realizes it should provide regular on-site safety inspec-
tions to protect the traveling public?
In the Lac-Me´gantic tragedy, it is evident that inadequate sur-
veillance of a rail operator’s activities endangered rail safety and
ultimately cost the lives of many innocent citizens. Although
there are fundamental differences between rail and air transpor-
tation, namely the punitive working culture in the rail industry,
the Lac-Me´gantic tragedy demonstrated how leaving operators
with a weak safety culture to manage their own safety can consti-
tute a serious hazard to society.165 In the past few years, the TSB
has repeatedly criticized TC’s “failure to identify companies’ in-
effective processes, and an imbalance between auditing
processes versus traditional inspections.”166 Even if companies
fill out SMS checklists and have adequate safety manuals, TC
must send inspectors out in the field and ensure that the car-
rier’s actual actions and behavior reflect the company’s SMS
paperwork. TC must be able to intervene when companies are
not using their SMS correctly to put an end to any unsafe or
unlawful practices.167
Coupled with the dismantling of effective regulatory oversight
by TC and the lack of safety inspectors, Justice Moshansky ar-
gued in 2007 that “18 years after Dryden, history is repeating
itself, only worse.”168 He further stated before ICAO that: “Press-
ing economic conditions, diminished regulatory oversight, and
inadequate aviation legislation preceded Dryden; these sympto-
matic precursors seem again to be with us.”169 The Chair of the
TSB, Kathy Fox, stated that inadequate oversight is a serious
problem.170 She further concluded that the efficiency of SMS
depends on effective oversight and that SMS should not be a
164 Aviation Inspectors Condemn Transport Canada’s Safety System, supra note 98.
165 Bruce Cheadle, Rail-Safety Audit Days Before Fatal Quebec Crash Sound “Signifi-




166 WATCHLIST FACT SHEET—MULTI-MODAL, supra note 44.
167 See id.
168 Campion-Smith, supra note 43.
169 Moshansky & Van Dyke, supra note 83, at 2.3.1.
170 News Release, Effective Oversight Vital to Aviation Safety, supra note 72.
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replacement for regulation or a substitute for oversight.171 We
must, therefore, urge the Canadian government and other
ICAO Member States to ensure proper oversight during their
transition toward SMS to avoid more deadly accidents. En-
hanced margins of safety should be the main priority for ICAO
Member States172 rather than the political rationing of govern-
ment oversight resources. While lawsuits may compensate and
ease the pain for families of victims,173 they cannot restore
health or human life.174 On the other hand, adequate regula-
tion can properly ensure the protection of life, and as such, SMS
coupled with regulatory safety oversight should benefit the trav-
eling public worldwide with increased or even near-perfect
safety levels over time.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
History has demonstrated that many sections in the CARS
have been written in the aftermath of serious accidents, such as
Air Ontario Flight 1363. Unless TC proactively responds by rein-
stating traditional safety inspection methods, this tragic ten-
dency will perpetuate itself. Canada has the benefit of already
knowing the current gaps in its SMS regime, and it should act
accordingly before history repeats itself. In summary, the follow-
ing solutions are forwarded to ensure safety throughout aviation
in Canada:
1. The Minister of Transport should reinstate traditional
forms of oversight, such as the NAP, combining opera-
171 Review of Canadian Transportation Safety Regime, Hearing Before the Standing
Comm. on Transp., Infrastructure & Cmtys., 41st Parl., 19th Meeting, at 4 (2014)
(Can.).
172 DEMPSEY & GOETZ, supra note 5, at 349.
173 The Canadian Press, Lac-Me´gantic Disaster Class-Action Suit Gets Green Light,
CBC NEWS (May 9, 2015), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/lac-m%C
3%A9gantic-disaster-class-action-suit-gets-green-light-1.3067920 [http://perma.
cc/YV8W-QUNQ]; The Canadian Press, Lac-Me´gantic Victims Will Be Compensated
in the New Year, Trustee Says, CBC NEWS (Dec. 13, 2015), http://www.cbc.ca/
news/canada/montreal/lac-megantic-settlement-money-1.3363372 [http://
perma.cc/5HYL-3B7L]; The Canadian Press, Lac-Me´gantic Lawsuit: Judge Rejects
Canadian Pacific Challenge, CBC NEWS (July 13, 2015), http://www.cbc.ca/news/
canada/montreal/lac-m%C3%A9gantic-lawsuit-judge-rejects-canadian-pacific-
challenge-1.3149986 [http://perma.cc/9F3J-6HXD]. At the time of this writing,
a class-action lawsuit had been initiated by the families of the victims, while the
provincial government of Que´bec has facilitated a $457 million settlement fund.
Lac-Me´gantic Victims Will Be Compensated in the New Year, Trustee Says, supra.
174 DEMPSEY & GOETZ, supra note 5, at 349.
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tional safety inspections of all airlines with the new SMS
audits;
2. The delegation of regulatory oversight activities to the in-
dustry for commercial airlines should be reversed and TC
should clearly establish the acceptable levels of safety for
SMS;
3. TC should be provided with sufficient resources to over-
see the industry properly (e.g., inspectors, training, and
monitoring tools) and to develop adequate SMS guidance
resources for carriers; and
4. The implementation of SMS for smaller 703 and 704 car-
riers should be reviewed. The framework should be tai-
lored to enable them to institute and operate SMS in the
most cost-effective and simplest manner possible consis-
tent with safety.
Of course, these remedial solutions should be of particular
interest to other ICAO Member States nearing the final stages of
implementation of SMS. It took the tragic deaths of forty-seven
people in Lac-Me´gantic for the Canadian Parliament to react
and instigate an extensive policy review of the role of SMS in all
modes of transportation, including commercial air transporta-
tion.175 Will the aviation industry wait until it is too late and have
its own “Air Me´gantic” tragedy before it reacts in a similar fash-
ion? As stated by Paul Dempsey, “[T]he development of aviation
policy has long been a reactive, rather than a proactive, pro-
cess.”176 For instance, before the enactment of the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act of 2001 (ATSA),177 security screen-
ing in the United States was delegated to struggling airlines until
their security deficiencies were exploited on September 11,
175 See Letter from The Honorable Lisa Raitt, Minister of Transp., to Larry
Miller, Chair, Standing Comm. on Transp., Infrastructure & Cmtys. (Nov. 18,
2013), http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/HOC/Committee/412/TRAN/
WebDoc/WD6308134/412_TRAN_reldoc_PDF/412_TRAN_reldoc-e.pdf [http:/
/perma.cc/LTY6-GAMR]; Lac-Me´gantic: Lisa Raitt Announces Rail Safety Rules
Based on Crash Findings, CBC NEWS (Oct. 29, 2014), http://www.cbc.ca/news/
politics/lac-m%C3%A9gantic-lisa-raitt-announces-rail-safety-rules-based-on-crash-
findings-1.2816680 [http://perma.cc/E4AL-4UFF]; Interim Report on Rail Safety
Review, supra note 117; Gordon Isfeld, Ottawa Tightens Railway Safety Measures in
Wake of Lac-Megantic Train Disaster, FIN. POST (Oct. 29, 2014), http://business
.financialpost.com/2014/10/29/ottawa-tightens-railway-safety-measures-in-wake-
of-lac-megantic-train-disaster/ [http://perma.cc/RBK8-SAB6].
176 Paul Stephen Dempsey, Aviation Security: The Role of Law in the War Against
Terrorism, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 649, 658 (2003).
177 See Aviation and Transp. Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107–71, 115 Stat. 597
(2001).
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2001.178 Canada has approached SMS in a very similar fashion,
and until we react to TC’s complacent oversight and SMS poli-
cies, Canadian carriers might suffer a similar tragic fate.179 SMS
is a brilliant approach to safety in theory, but without a struc-
tured and balanced oversight from the government, there is the
potential for a serious accident.
Government regulation in aviation has often behaved like a
pendulum—with the weight of safety moving away from its
center as the opposing weight of economic regulation breaks
the equilibrium between safety and market efficiency. When
safety margins are over-extended, the opposite weight of safety
comes crashing down with a destructive effect on the airline in-
dustry.180 As Paul Dempsey concludes, there is no doubt that vic-
tims of the past would “gain little comfort in knowing that Adam
Smith’s invisible hands vindicated their deaths by strangling the
economic life out of the unsafe airline.”181 Alternatively, we
must ask ourselves if more economic regulation, balanced with
adequate safety enforcement, is the long-term solution to the
negative externalities that have persisted since airline deregula-
tion in Canada. While strong airline markets previously enabled
airlines to exceed TC regulations, safety standards in Canadian
aviation, including SMS, have become the ceiling, rather than
the floor, for acceptable operations.182 Unfortunately, it is now
clear that “[t]he financial problems of deregulation are related
to the [current] safety problems.”183
We must now come to grips with the conclusion that airline
deregulation did in fact contribute to the deregulation of cer-
tain aspects of flight safety. In response to this, moderate eco-
nomic re-regulation is the only solution that would enable the
airline market to satisfy the public interest by achieving social
goals, such as ensuring the traveling public’s safety and well-be-
ing.184 Aviation “has too vast a social and economic impact to
178 See Dempsey, Aviation Security, supra note 176, at 712.
179 See PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 82, at 798–99.
180 “Professor Frederick Thayer reminds us that safety always has suffered when
airlines were largely unregulated.” DEMPSEY & GOETZ, supra note 5, at 301.
181 Id. at 306.
182 Id.
183 AIRLINE MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES, supra note 4, at 372.
184 DEMPSEY & GOETZ, supra note 5, at 341–42. “Nonetheless, the need for gov-
ernment to facilitate the market’s ability to accomplish desirable social and eco-
nomic objectives has long been recognized.” Id. “Like economic goals, political
and social goals sometimes cannot be achieved through the economic system
because they conflict with businesses’ goal to maximize profits.” Id. at 342.
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leave it to the whims of a dwindling club of unconstrained mo-
nopolists.”185 Since safety cannot be separated from the eco-
nomic health of airlines, the safety benefits of SMS can only be
achieved if we pay more attention to the economic health of the
aviation industry.186 If reintroducing economic regulation can
temper market imperatives by eliminating the problems of im-
perfect competition, the industry will likely become more pro-
ductive and efficient. A healthy industry will in turn make
healthy organizational decisions. While the SMS methodology
focuses on an airline’s ability to safely manage organizational
decisions, even well-intentioned airlines may not be able to func-
tion under the onerous requirements of SMS if they remain in
financial distress. The government is in a unique position to fos-
ter healthier markets by reinstating moderate economic regula-
tion that is more conducive to safety-oriented decisions, rather
than the current airlines’ predatory practices that aim to in-
crease profitability at the expense of safety. If the government is
able to regulate an airline’s managerial decisions with economic
measures, it will create an operational context compatible with
SMS to further achieve safety goals and, in turn, protect the lives
of the traveling public.
185 Id. at 358.
186 Id. at 350.
